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scenarios, such as those involving Tai-
wan, might motivate China to attempt
to deter American intervention by the
threat of nuclear strikes or damage to
U.S. space assets.
O’Rourke’s study raises important ques-
tions as the United States develops a new
maritime strategy. If preventing Taiwan
independence and promoting reunifica-
tion is the present focus of China’s naval
development, what other national inter-
ests might fuel such development in the
future? What is the proper balance for
the U.S. Navy between supporting oper-
ations in the global war on terror and
maintaining (if not increasing) its pres-
ence and operational capabilities in the
vast, strategically vital Asia-Pacific re-
gion? What resources will be required
to meet the latter requirements, and
how should they be allocated? Finally,
what fleet and basing architecture can
best accomplish this at sustainable cost
to taxpayers?
Critical procurement decisions with
ramifications for years to come are be-
ing made in Beijing as China develops a
new five-year plan. As this dual strate-
gic crossroads looms ever larger, it is to
be hoped that the two Pacific powers
can reach an understanding about their
respective regional roles and thereby
keep competitive coexistence from de-
generating into a new cold war.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON
Naval War College
Wortzel, Larry M. China’s Nuclear Forces: Oper-
ations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control,
and Campaign Planning. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.:
U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Insti-
tute, 2007. 51pp.
In China’s Nuclear Forces Larry Wortzel
has delivered an exceptional mono-
graph that demands the attention of
both nuclear strategists and China ex-
perts. The author, a leading authority
on China, Asia, national security, and
military strategy, is currently serving as
a commissioner on the congressionally
mandated U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission. He previ-
ously served as the director of the Asian
Studies Center and vice president for
foreign policy at the Heritage Founda-
tion. Wortzel’s distinguished thirty-
two-year career in the U.S. armed
forces, during which time he served as
both assistant Army attaché and then
attaché at the American embassy in
China, culminated with an assignment
as director of the Strategic Studies Insti-
tute at the Army War College.
The title of this monograph promises
an expansive scope, and Wortzel deliv-
ers quite ably. While the scale of the
work is extremely helpful in keeping the
various aspects and issues in perspec-
tive, the most important new contribu-
tions to understanding the evolving
Chinese nuclear posture are Wortzel’s
treatments of “no first use” and nuclear
command and control. As stated by the
author, “The major insights . . . come
from exploiting sections of . . . A Guide
to the Study of Campaign Theory[,] . . .
an unclassified ‘study guide’ for PLA of-
ficers on how to understand and apply
doctrine.” These insights, however,
which Wortzel so adeptly lays forth, are
corroborated in other reliable Chinese-
language material.
It has become conventional wisdom
among China scholars to take Chinese
declaratory policy of “no first use” of
nuclear weapons at face value, excusing
away various past unofficial statements
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suggesting that “no first use” ought not
to be taken quite so literally. Wortzel
offers a counterbalance to this view,
elucidating both the concept of pre-
emptive counterattack and the current
debate within China on the viability
and utility of adherence to “no first
use.” His conclusion on this crucial is-
sue is that the debate within China on
“no first use” is real, that a new genera-
tion of officers, diplomats, and scholars
leans significantly toward modifying or
jettisoning such a declaratory policy. In
fact, this conclusion is quite in accord
with the one developed and briefed by
the Mahan Scholars student research
team at the Naval War College in the
spring of 2007.
Regarding nuclear command and con-
trol, Wortzel finds that the originator of
valid firing orders for the Second Artil-
lery is the Central Military Commission
(CMC), “the highest and most central-
ized level of military leadership in the
Chinese Communist Party.” While we
would agree that tongshuaibu, or “su-
preme command,” probably refers to
the CMC in the context of nuclear re-
lease authority, this is not completely
clear, and explicit phraseology to bol-
ster that conception was uncomfortably
dropped from defense white papers of
2004 to 2006. Furthermore, in other
writings it appears that conventional-
missile firing authority during conflict
is certainly delegated downward, to the
Second Artillery itself. Such delegation
is, of course, to be expected, but in a
conflict that involved the movement of
nuclear forces and became intense, the
concomitant risks of unauthorized or
inadvertent nuclear missile launch
would grow alarmingly.
In addition to solid scholarship regard-
ing the question of “no first use” and
nuclear command and control, this
monograph offers substantial original
material on missile-force readiness lev-
els, survivability issues, and targeting.
Overall, as expected from an academician
of Wortzel’s caliber, this work expands
our understanding of the Chinese nu-
clear posture. As such, it demands the




Sawyer, Ralph D. The Tao of Deception: Unor-
thodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China.
New York: Basic Books, 2007. 489pp. $29.95
Ralph D. Sawyer, noted scholar of Chi-
nese strategic thought, has produced an
enlightening study of the beginnings and
the evolution of deception in Chinese
political and military history. Contrary
to some contemporary commentators,
China has a long martial tradition.
Warrior leaders and military heroes
permeate both historic and contempo-
rary Chinese literature, as well as mod-
ern movies. Deception has long been an
integral part of Chinese warfare. Draw-
ing on the classic works of Chinese mil-
itary thought, Sawyer demonstrates that
deceptive practices and unorthodox ap-
proaches are the norm rather than the
exception. Deception is a fundamental
tenet of Chinese strategic culture, one
that permeates strategic thinking not
only in the military realm but also in
the diplomatic, information, political,
and economic spheres. (Readers of
Sawyer’s previous work, The Tao of
Spycraft, reviewed in the Winter 2007
issue of this journal, will recall that
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